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convenience of administration would be sufficiently increased
nor difficulty of proof sufficiently obviated to justify the imposi-
tion of absolute liability in a situation such as this where
grave injustice could easily result. But, even if the court is
correct in its interpretation of the Minnesota statute, there is
no compelling reason for the court to hold that a criminal
statute of the absolute liability type is applicable at all in a
civil action. As Professor Clarence Morris has indicated, only
those criminal statutes which are founded on a wrong-doing
theory should be considered applicable in a civil case unless
some other reason exists for shifting the loss.13 No such
reason is apparent here.
The Minnesota court also indicated that there could be lia-
bility on these facts even in the absence of the statute, i.e.,
liability based on common law negligence. It is difficult to
find any foreseeable risk of harm to any person merely from
overloading the cars or from failing to remove the drippings
as often as they could have been removed. In the absence of
foreseeability of some harm to some person, it would seem that
the conduct could not be characterized as negligent. 4
Since the statute does not seem to be one which results in
criminal guilt in the absence of a showing that the actor
intended to deface a sign, and since, even if the court were
correct in construing the statute as one imposing liability on the
basis of conduct alone there is no compelling reason for applying
such a statute in a civil case, it is submitted that the court erred
in allowing the jury to find negligence based on a breach of the
statute. It also appears that since there is no foreseeability
of any harm to any person, the court was in error in saying
that common law negligence could be found.
PAUL V. LuTz
TORTS-VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE Per Se
OR MERE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
Defendant's truck-driver was driving along the highway with
the intention of turning left at an intersection. He failed to
yield the right of way to the plaintiff who approached from the
13. Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
CoL. L. REv. 21 (1949).
14. PROSSER, TORTS 341 (1941).
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rear at a higher rate of speed. The defendant's driver then
turned left without moving into the proper lane or giving the
proper hand signal, and struck the plaintiff who was passing
at the intersection. Regulatory traffic statutes provided for
criminal liability for each of these acts: failing to yield the
right of way to a passing car, turning from an improper lane,
turning without proper hand signals and, on the plaintiff's
part, passing at an intersection. The court held that the
violation by the plaintiff was sufficient to bar his recovery,
denominating such a violation negligence per se. The court
further held that it was clear that the plaintiff's negligence
in this respect contributed to the injury as a proximate cause
of the collision and its consequences.'
The case poses the problem of whether the violation of a
criminal statute which does not provide for civil liability should,
of itself, constitute negligence in a civil action. The courts
are in complete disagreement on the question. A majority of
the jurisdictions holds that the violation of such a statute is
negligence per se,2 with a strong minority holding that such a
statutory violation is evidence of negligence only.'
In an ordinary negligence action, where the violation of a
statute is not involved, the question of whether the actor was
negligent is presented to the jury as though that question
required the determination of but one issue. The court instructs
the jury that negligence is the term used to describe conduct
which, though engaged in without the intent to harm another,
does subject that other to an unreasonable risk of harm.4 The
court further instructs the jury in terms of the reasonable man
of ordinary prudence, who always acts so as not to subject
others to an unreasonable risk of harm. The jury then de-
termines what the reasonable man would have done under the
circumstances of the case, or, in other words, the jury deter-
mines the particular standard of care required. It then
compares the conduct in question with that of the reasonable
man in order to determine whether the actor is negligent. The
1. Cole v. Fletcher Lumber Co., 230 N.C. 616, 55 S.E.2d 86 (1949).
2. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HA v.
L. REV. 453 (1933). For approval of this position see Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1914).
3. For a defense of this position, see Lowndes, Civil Liability Created
by Criminal Legislation. 16 MINN. L. Rnv. 361 (1932).
4. PRossER, TORTs 176 (1941).
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entire negligence question is thus left to the jury in the ordinary
case, and, in general, is considered as though it were one issue.
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out5 that, in reality, the question
of whether the actor was negligent involves two separate and
distinct issues. The first of these is the so-called "factual"
sub-issue, and it involves only the question, sometimes a complex
one, of what the actor in fact did. That issue obviously requires
only a factual determination of the type ordinarily entrusted
to juries. The second issue is the so-called "ethical" sub-issue,
and that involves a particularization of the general standard
of due care to meet the circumstances of the case. That deter-
mination obviously involves a value judgment which in effect
"makes" the substantive law insofar as the particular case is
concerned. In other situations, the answering of such questions
is conceived of as being a function of the court and not of the
jury, and it is properly labeled a "question of law." It was
Holmes' position that in negligence cases the jury should decide
only the factual sub-issue, and that the ethical sub-issue should
be determined by the court.
Holmes' theory has not received wide acceptance in the courts.
There are, however, at least two instances where that general
result is reached. In cases where the trial judge finds that the
question of whether the conduct of the actor fails to come up
to the reasonable man standard is one on which reasonable men
cannot differ, he so instructs the jury. This is an instance of
the court's deciding the ethical sub-issue, for the court,
allowing for all reasonable variations in the standard the
jury might establish, finds, "as a matter of law," that the
actor's conduct does not measure up to that standard, whatever
it might be.'
The second group of cases, of which the principal case is
one, consists of those cases where the violation of a statute
is held to be negligence as a matter of law. In cases of this
sort, however, the Holmesian approach is followed in part only,
that is, the jury decides only the factual sub-issue, but the
standard is set primarily by the legislature, with the judge's
function being only negative. Under the existing choices, the
5. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 120-129 (4th ed. 1938).
6. Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596. 49 N.E. 1010 (1897); but compare
the dissenting opinion by Knowlton, J., id. at 601, 49 N.E. at 1011.
7. PROSSER, TORTS 279 (1941).
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judge may accept the legislative standard as the proper one, or
he may leave the value judgment for the jury. In the principal
case, the court held that the ethical sub-issue had been decided
by the legislature, leaving only the factual sub-issue to the jury.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the judge is required to rule
that the violation of the criminal statute is negligence per se
on the theory that the legislature has, by forbidding certain
acts, made absolute the standard of care required, and any
violation of the statute is deemed to be inconsistent with the
minimum degree of care which the legislature established.'
Professor Clarence Morris has attacked the exclusive use of
the negligence per se doctrine.9 He reasons that compensatory
damages in tort cases are for the purposes of "making the
plaintiff whole again," but that there should always be some
reason for the reparation. In other words, there should not be
liability without fault unless the imposition of such liability is
explainable in some manner. Since some statutes are not based
on any wrong-doing theory, and since conduct which is usually
undesirable may, at times, be innocent, the negligence per se
doctrine may result in the imposition of liability in situations
where the actor is neither at fault nor otherwise deserving of
admonition, and is no better able to bear or distribute the loss
than the injured party.
The courts have seemingly taken the position that the only
alternative to strict adherence to the negligence per se doctrine
is the complete abandonment of it. Such abandonment results
in the minority view that the legislature, in enacting a criminal
statute for the purpose of preserving the peace or of protecting
life and limb, does not intend to change the common law duty
of due care under the circumstances, and, therefore, that a
violation of such a statute is only evidence of negligence. And
they have further said that since the legislature has established
no new duty, the violation of a statute is of no more weight
than any other evidence of negligence. Professor Morris disap-
proves of strict adherence to that doctrine also.10  He points
out that since the determination of the ethical sub-issue is so
often left to the jury with no other instruction than a definition
8. PROSSE, ToRTs 265 (1941).
9. Morris, supra note 2; Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negli-
gence Actions, 49 COL. L. REv. 21 (1949).
10. Ibid.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss2/11
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of the reasonable man, the jury is likely to disregard the studied
conclusion of the legislature which is presumably more experi-
enced in laying down standards in situations where the legisla-
tive standard is the appropriate one.
In the Restatement of Torts the American Law Institute has
adopted the negligence per se theory of the effect of statutory
violation.11 It is interesting to note that in Comment c to
Section 286, the restaters have answered many of the objections
raised by Professor Morris to the strict adherence to the negli-
gence per se doctrine. But there still remain those statutes
which are not based on any wrong-doing theory. In those
instances, there might clearly be criminal liability and still be
no sound reason for imposing civil responsibility.
Professor Morris suggests that the best solution to the conflict
is to take the best of each; to allow the court, in cases where it
decides that the legislative standard is the correct one, to take
it as being determinative of the ethical sub-issue. The court
should state in the instructions to the jury that the standard of
care is such and that any deviation therefrom will result in
liability. This may be done with or without reference to the
statute involved. In all cases where the court does not feel sure
that the standard set forth by the legislature is the proper one
for the determination of the ethical sub-issue of negligence in a
particular case, it should be free to state that the standard
is due care under the circumstances and that the violation of
the statute may be considered as evidence of negligence in
determining the issue.
By giving the courts this freedom to choose between incon-
sistent theories upon the exercise of sound discretion, the best
elements of each doctrine are preserved. The doctrine of
negligence per se is preserved in those cases where the court
feels that the ends of justice can be obtained and the futility of
submitting a question to the jury on which reasonable men
cannot differ is avoided. On the other hand, the weaknesses of
the negligence per se doctrine can be remedied by submitting
cases of statutory violation, where the court is not satisfied
that the legislative standard is the proper one, to the jury for
a determination of the ethical sub-issue as well as the factual
one.
11. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 286 (1934).
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These theories and principles, which often present hard prob-
lems when applied to individual cases, offer little room for
conflict when applied to the principal case. Here the plaintiff's
actions were clearly proximate as opposed to remote causes of
the collision and damages. There was no showing of emergency
or other excuse which prevents plaintiff's conduct from being
blameworthy. The legislative enactment was for the purpose
of warning against and preventing just such accidents as here
occurred. So, there being no question as to the wisdom or
applicability of the statute, the negligence per se rule as applied
by the court was correct and appropriate. However, should
the case have arisen in a jurisdiction which follows the evidence
of negligence doctrine, the court would have submitted the issue
to the jury with instructions to the effect that the violation of
the statute should be considered as evidence of negligence. From
the reported facts, there is no indication of any factor which
would lead the jury to a verdict inconsistent with the one
reached by the court. The jury, in setting up a standard of its
own, would most likely find due care under the circumstances
to be quite similar to the standard laid down by the legislature.
And it, too, would find that the plaintiff's actions did not
measure up to the standard. But it would not have to do so.
One question in this field which does not seem to have been
touched upon by previous writers is whether the violation of
the statute must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, as is
required in a criminal case under the same statute, or whether
a mere preponderance of evidence as in other civil cases is suffi-
cient. It would seem that at least in jurisdictions where the
negligence per se doctrine prevails, that the violation should
be proved more clearly in cases where there is some doubt as
to the applicability of the statute.
The negligence per se doctrine is of great merit in many cases.
Its major defect is compulsory adherence in cases where it is in-
applicable. The ethical sub-issue of negligence should be decided
by the judge, at least to the extent that he should decide whether
the standard of conduct prescribed by the legislature is
applicable in the particular case. If he is not clearly convinced
that the standard so set out should be applied, he should be
allowed to submit the cause to the jury with instructions which
permit it to determine the standard to which to apply the facts,
in determining liability. MCCORMICK V. WILSON
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